UNULAS OF LESS BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SURVEY GROUP REPORT (Ref. NSC 10)

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It is recognized that centralized control of operations in the "delicate field" of covert operations is essential to their success. NSC 10 provides adequately for such centralization at the National (Washington) level by charging a single Director with the preparation and review of plans. Provision is made for representation upon the Director's Staff of agencies who will participate in operations and for the preparation of plan by the operating agency wherever practicable. Hence, in most instances the agency to be charged with operations will accomplish its own plans and in all instances the operating agencies will, through their representatives on the staff, be able to effect the requisite "Washington level" coordination.

Integration of covert operations and secret intelligence activities will, wherever necessary, be accomplished by active participation of the CIA representative upon the staff and by close cooperation between the Director of Special Studies and the Director, CIA, each operating under the MSC.

Coordination within operational areas of all covert activities, intelligence and operational, is a problem of major concern. It is to be expected that the selection of the particular agency to plan for and conduct covert operations and that the plans themselves, will be strongly influenced by the advisability of continuing or establishing within a theater or area centralized control of covert activities.

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The extremely broad scope of the operations contemplated in MSC 10 will severely test the capabilities
of the assigned Director of Special Studies. He must
be an expert and specialist in many fields. The concentration of responsibility for secret intelligence, itself a field of high specialization, and for covert operations in one head is considered inadvisable. Consideration
also must be given to the inadvisability within a democracy
of concentrating in one head the control of all the nation's
covert activities.

The inclusion of responsibility for programming overt phases of psychological warfare ("white" propagands) for war, an endeavor requiring close coordination with plans for "black" psychological warfare, is but one example of the contemplated functions of the Director of Special Studies not closely allied with secret intelligence.

NSC 10 contemplates the operational use of existing agencies in order to preclude the requirement for a new agency or service which could not be effectively supported by funds anticipated during peace. It is conceivable that the Director may at a later date require operational personnel not available through established agencies. If such a requirement develops there is no restriction, other than fund availability, to his procuring and utilizing such personnel. If all secret activities are compartmented in a new, separate agency, the coordination of such activitie may be simplified but their coordination with overt opera-

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tions becomes much more difficult.

The duplications of effort anticipated by the NSC Survey Group in the field of covert activity may be increased manifold if existing agencies are not utilized to the fullest and if separate personnel are assigned operational responsibilities in areas where suitable U.S. representation already exists. Admittedly the "delicacy" of many operations may preclude utilization of personnel immediately available within an area, in which case alternative action must be adopted.

In conclusion, the arguments presented by the survey group, even if overriding in the consideration of the problem do not obviate the advisability of approval of MSC 10 as an important first step in the organizational development of a proper agency, group or staff to undertake planning for current and wartime covert operations.

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